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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
This reply brief is necessary to address the State's erroneous characterizations
of Appellant's arguments, the State's omissions of relevant and contrary portions of the
cases it cites, and to point out the State's lack of argument in opposition to the actual
issues raised in the Appellant's Brief.
A further description of the Nature of the Case is set forth in Appellant's Brief,
and need not be repeated but is incorporated herein by reference.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings were previously
articulated in Mr. Hughes's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply
Brief, but are incorporated herein by reference thereto.
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ISSUES
1.

Has the State misunderstood Mr. Hughes' argument that his Sixth Amendment
right to the effective assistance of counsel during a psychosexual evaluation
includes the right to the presence of counsel?

2.

Is the State incorrect in its assertion that the suppression of at least the
polygraph results, and maybe the psychosexual, would involve a "novel theory"
of law because, it claims, Mr. Hughes was not entitled to Miranda warnings prior
to the polygraph examination?

3.

Does the State confuse the distinction between the issues of asking for a
different evaluation at sentencing and obtaining a confidential evaluation that is
not disclosed prior to sentencing?

4.

Does the State's claim that Mr. Hughes has not established a prima facie claim of
prejudice ignore the factual support provided by the record?
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ARGUMENT

I.
The State Misunderstood Mr. Hughes' Argument That His Sixth Amendment Right To
The Effective Assistance Of Counsel During A Psvchosexual Evaluation Includes
The Right To The Presence Of Counsel
A.

Introduction
Although the state characterizes Idaho's psychosexual evaluation as analogous

to a competency hearing or a hearing at which the defendant has put his mental status
at issue, that comparison is unavailing as the comparison is not between two similar
items. Additionally, the State has failed to acknowledge or apply the Idaho Supreme
Court's holding in Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 149 P.23d 833 (2006) that a
psychosexual evaluation is a critical stage of the proceedings.

B.

The State Misunderstood Mr. Hughes' Argument That His Sixth Amendment
Right To The Effective Assistance Of Counsel During A Psvchosexual Evaluation
Includes The Right To The Presence Of Counsel
The State understands Mr. Hughes argument to be that the Estrada Court

implicitly found a right to the presence of counsel during a psychosexual evaluation.
(Respondent's Brief, p.8.) However, Mr. Hughes never claimed that the Estrada Court
"implicitly held" there was a Sixth Amendment right to the presence of counsel at a
psychosexual evaluation. Mr. Hughes argued that what the Estrada Court implicitly held
was that the psychosexual evaluation constituted a critical stage of the proceedings.
(Appellant's Brief, p. 10, "The acknowledgement of the client's Sixth Amendment right is
recognition that this period of the prosecution is a critical stage and as such, the client
has the protection of the Sixth Amendment during this critical stage.")
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Mr. Hughes never asserted that "the Court in Estrada 'implicitly held' that the right to
counsel includes the right to the presence of counsel.' (Respondent's brief, p.8, citing
Appellant's Brief, pp.12-13.)

Instead, what Mr. Hughes actually argued was that,

The Estrada Court implicitly held that the psychosexual evaluation was a
critical stage because, "[l]f the stage is not critical, there can be no
constitutional violation no matter how deficient counsel's performance." In
finding a Sixth Amendment constitutional violation, the Estrada Court
necessarily found that the time period in which the psychosexual
evaluation occurred was a critical stage.
(Appellant's brief, p. 12, citing Estrada, 143 Idaho 558, 562, 143 P.3d 833, 839 (2007)
(internal citations omitted)). Thus, Mr. Hughes' argument is not based on the premise
that this Court has already implicitly decided the right to the presence of counsel issue.
Because of the State's misunderstanding of Hughes' argument, the State incorrectly
focuses on whether the psychosexual evaluation constitutes a critical stage and does
not address the scope of the right to counsel or the meaning of the "assistance" of
counsel. Further, by relying on federal cases that hold there is no right to the presence
of counsel during a presentence interview, (Respondent's Brief, pp.8-10,) the State fails
to recognize the Estrada Court has already explicitly held that one is entitled to at least
the assistance of counsel during the psychosexual evaluation, thus implicitly finding that
stage to be critical.
C.

Because The State Has Failed To Acknowledge The Holding Of Estrada That
The Psychosexuaf Evalatuion ls A Critical Stage, The State Has Failed To
Address The Resulting Impact Of The Right To The Assistance Of Counsel
In addressing Mr. Hughes' claim that his attorney rendered ineffective assistance

of counsel by not being present during the psychosexual evaluation, the State has
incorrectly understood Mr. Hughes' argument. Mr. Hughes does not allege that the right
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to the presence of counsel was implicitly recognized in Estrada. Rather, he asserts that

Estrada implicitly recognized that the psychosexual evaluation was a critical stage of the
proceedings. As a corollary to this finding, he asks this Court to now find that because
this is a critical stage, Mr. Hughes was entitled to the assistance of counsel, including
the presence of counsel.
As the Court in Estrada implicitly held, the psychosexual evaluation constitutes a
critical stage, entitling Mr. Hughes to the assistance of counsel. Because federal courts
have not defined the Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI) as a critical
stage, the cases cited by the State do not define the scope of the right to counsel at a
critical stage nor define the meaning of "assistance" of counsel. They are, therefore,
irrelevant to the determination of the issues before the court in this case.

D.

The State Appears To Have Incorrectly Understood Mr. Hughes' Claim To Be
That He Is Entiled To The Presence Of Counsel In All Psychological Evaluations
In addressing Mr. Hughes' claim the State also appears to have incorrectly

understood Mr. Hughes' claim to be that the right to the presence of counsel extends to
all psychological evaluations. Mr. Hughes does not allege that the right to the presence
of counsel extends to pre-trial competency hearings or hearings where a defendant has
put his mental status at issue. Rather, Mr. Hughes asserts that the right to the presence
of counsel extends to psychological evaluations that have Fifth Amendment implications
or are an adversarial hearing.
The State's reliance on United States v. Trapne/1, 495 F.2d 22 (2 nd Cir. 1974), United

States v. Bondurant, 689 F.2d 1246 (5th Cir. 1982), In Re Appeal in Maricopa County,
893 P.2d 60 (Az. App. Div. 1, 1994), People v. Mahaffey, 651 N.Ed. 2d 1055 (Ill. 1995),
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Cain v. Abramson, 220 S.W. 3d 276 (Ky. 2007), Thorson v. State, 895 So.2d 85 (Miss.

2005), Commonwealth v. Banks, 943 A.2d 230 (Pa. 2007), State v. Hardy, 325 S.E. 2d
320 (S.C. 1985), and State v. Martin, 950 S.W.2d 20 (Tenn. 1997), seems to indicate
that the State reads Mr. Hughes' claim to be that he is entitled to the presence of
counsel in all psychological evaluations. Mr. Hughes does not assert this but rather,
asserts that he is entitled to the presence of counsel in all psychological evaluations
wherein his Fifth Amendment rights are implicated or that constitute an adversarial
proceeding wherein he would be required to make strategic or legal decisions.
All the cases cited by the State hold that a competency evaluation was not a critical
stage - a significant difference from what the Idaho Supreme court has already held
regarding a psychosexual evaluation. In addition, the reasons for which the courts held
the competency hearing was not a critical stage compels the opposite result for
psychosexual evaluations.

For example, the primary bases for the foreign courts to

hold that the competency evaluation was not a critical stage was because the
evaluation was not an adversarial proceeding, nor were there any Fifth Amendment
implications.

In contrast, the Idaho Supreme Court held precisely the opposite in

regards to psychosexual evaluations in Estrada.
More specifically, all of the cases cited by the State apply either to competency
hearings, for which Fifth Amendment protections are provided pursuant to court rule or
statute1, or apply to hearings in which the defendant has placed his mental status at
issue, and thereby waived his Fifth Amendment right.

1

Ky.R.Cr. 7.24(B)(ii) ("No statement made by the defendant in the course of any
examination provided for by this rule, whether the examination be with or without the
consent of the defendant, shall be admissible into evidence against the defendant in
6

i.

In A Case In Which A Defendant Asserts A Mental Status Defense, He
Puts The Evidence Of His Mental Status At Issue

A psychosexual evaluation is court-ordered; the defendant has not proffered a
mental status defense, thereby putting his mental status at issue. However, when a
defendant does proffer a mental status defense, he has put his mental status at
issue, and cannot deprive the State of the only method by which it can rebut his

any criminal proceeding. No testimony by the expert based upon such statement, and
no fruits of the statement shall be admissible into evidence against the defendant in any
criminal proceeding except upon an issue regarding mental condition on which the
defendant has introduced testimony. If the examination ordered under this rule pertains
to the issue of punishment (excluding a pretrial hearing under KRS 532.135), the court
shall enter an order prohibiting disclosure to the attorneys for either party of any selfincriminating information divulged by the defendant until the defendant is found guilty of
a felony offense ... ") Mississippi Uniform Rules of Circuit and County Court Practice
9.07, "The court may, upon motion of the prosecuting attorney, require the defendant
examined by a competent psychiatrist selected by the court. No statement made by the
accused in the course of any examination provided for by this rule shall be admitted in
evidence against the defendant on the issue of guilt in any criminal proceeding.");
Az.Rev.Stat.Ann. §13-4508(A), "The privilege against self-incrimination applies to any
examination that is ordered by the court pursuant to this chapter."
Az.
Rev.Stat.Ann. §13-4508(8) "any evidence or statement that is obtained during an
examination is not admissible at any proceeding to· determine a defendant's guilt or
innocence unless the defendant presents evidence that is intended to rebut the
presumption of insanity;" 725 ILCS 5/104-14(a) "Statements made by the defendant and
information gathered in the course of any examination or treatment ordered under
Section 104-13, 104-17 or 104-20 shall not be admissible against the defendant unless
he raises the defense of insanity or the defense of drugged or intoxicated condition, in
which case they shall be admissible only on the issue of whether he was insane,
drugged, or intoxicated."); 50 P.S. § 7402(e)(3) "The person shall be entitled to have
counsel present with him and shall not be required to answer any questions or to
perform tests unless he has moved for or agreed to the examination. Nothing said or
done by such person during the examination may be used as evidence against him in
any criminal proceedings on any issue other than that of his mental condition.")
Tenn.R.Crim.P.12.2(c) provides in pertinent part: No statement made by the defendant
in the course of any examination provided for by this rule, whether the examination be
with or without the consent of the defendant, no testimony by the expert based upon
such statement, and no other fruits of the statement shall be admitted into evidence
against the defendant in any criminal proceeding except for impeachment purposes or
on an issue respecting mental condition on which the defendant has introduced
testimony.
7

claim. For example, in State v. Martin, 950 S.W.2d 20 (Tenn. 1997), the court was
asked to determine whether the client waived his Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination when he invoked the insanity defense and whether the client had a
right to the assistance of counsel during a competency evaluation.

Id. at 20-21.

Therein, the defendant, in response to a charge of first-degree murder, filed notice of
intent to rely on a mental responsibility defense. Id. at 20. The State then asked for,
and the court ordered, a mental examination. Id.

Following a hearing, the court

appeared to expand the scope of the evaluation and ordered "Martin to undergo a
mental evaluation to determine his competency and his mental state at the time of
the offense." Id. at 21. The court thereafter entered a protective order, holding that
no statements or fruits of the statements made during the course of the evaluation
could be introduced at trial "unless and until the issue of mental responsibility is
raised ... or for impeachment purposes as provided by Rule 12.2(c)."

Id. at 22.

Tenn.R.Crim.P. 12.22 limits the use of the statements made by the defendant and
effectively provides Fifth Amendment protections to the defendant during the course
of the evaluation. The Tennessee Court recognized the potential Fifth Amendment
implications in court-ordered evaluations:
Preliminarily, we recognize that there are obvious concerns generated
when a defendant is compelled to undergo a mental examination at which
he or she will, in all likelihood, discuss not only details of his or her life but
also information about the charged offense. While numerous federal and
2

Tenn.R.Crim.P.12.2(c) provides in pertinent part: No statement made by the defendant
in the course of any examination provided for by this rule, whether the examination be
with or without the consent of the defendant, no testimony by the expert based upon
such statement, and no other fruits of the statement shall be admitted into evidence
against the defendant in any criminal proceeding except for impeachment purposes or
on an issue respecting mental condition on which the defendant has introduced
testimony.
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state jurisdictions have confronted these issues, there has been little
discussion in Tennessee and essentially no detailed analysis of the
procedures set forth in Rule 12.2.

Id.

The court held that the Tennessee Criminal Rule sufficiently protected the

defendant's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination for any statements, or any
fruits derived from the statements made during the evaluation. The court further held
that the information obtained in the evaluation could only be used against the defendant
if he invoked a mental status defense, such as an insanity defense, for which he waived
any Fifth Amendment claim to the information. Id. at 25.
As to the right to counsel, the court held it was not a critical stage because the
defendant,
was not confronted by the procedural system; he had no decisions in the
nature of legal strategy or tactics to make - not even, as we have seen,
the decision whether to refuse, on Fifth Amendment grounds, to answer
the psychiatrist's questions. The only conceivable role for counsel at the
examination would have been to observe ....
Id. at 26.

Similarly, in Trapne/1 and Appeal in Maricopa County, the defendants were
attempting to raise a mental status defense - in Trapne/1, it was the insanity defense
(495 F.2d 22 at 24) and in Appeal in Maricopa County it was battered child syndrome.
(182 Ariz. 60, 64.) In both cases, the courts ruled that when a defendant places his
mental condition in issue, he waives his Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination in that hearing. (495 F.2d 22, 182 Ariz. 60 at 64.) The respective courts
also held that given the nature of the hearings, they were not critical stages to which the
right to the assistance of counsel attached. (495 F.2d at 24-25, 182 Ariz. 60 at 64-65.)
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ii.

Competency
Evaluations

Evaluations

Are

Not

Analogous

To

Psychosexual

As Idaho clearly holds that "both at the point of sentencing and earlier, for
purposes of a psychological evaluation, a defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege
applies," and in some circumstances, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel also
applies, (Estrada, 143 at 563, 149 P.3d at 838), it is curious that the State would cite to
foreign jurisdictions to hold there is no Sixth Amendment right to counsel in competency
hearings when those holdings rest, in part, upon a premise that there is no potential
Fifth Amendment implications for those hearings, and thus, no reason for Sixth
Amendment protections.

In Cain v. Abramson, for example, Kentucky Criminal

Procedure Rule 7.24(3)(B)(ii) provides Fifth Amendment protections similar to the
Tennessee Court rule cited above in Martin, supra. And, like the Tennessee Court, the
Kentucky Court used the same standard to determine whether the competency
evaluation constituted a critical stage, and concluded it did not. 220 S.W.3d 276 at 280.
Additionally, because, unlike psychosexual evaluations, competency evaluations
do not involve adversarial proceedings, in Hardy, supra, the court found a competency
evaluation not to be a critical stage because "procedural steps are not taken and no
events take place that are likely to prejudice the defense. Psychiatric evaluations are
not adversarial proceedings and defendants are not asked to plead to charges or to
make statements to be used at trial." Hardy, 325 S.E.2d at 322.
As recognized in Estrada, a psychosexual evaluation is fraught with the possibility
that the defendant may provide information that may either provide the basis for
additional charges or the imposition of a harsher sentence.

In a psychosexual

evaluation, the information sought is "more in-depth and personal, and includes an
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inquiry into the defendant's sexual history, with verification by polygraph being highly
recommended," Estrada, 143 Idaho at 562, 149 P.3d at 837. Also, the information has
the potential of being self-incriminatory, and could include information about the
charged offense.

Id; State v. Martin, 950 S.W.2d 20, 23 (1997),

As such, a

psychosexual evaluation has the potential to "prejudice the defense" and involves a
defendant making statements to be used against him,
In contrast, in a competency evaluation, because there is no discussion of the
current offense, and the defendant is provided Fifth Amendment guarantees, "the
defendant [is] not confronted by the procedural system; he had no decisions in the
nature of legal strategy or tactics to make - not even, as we have seen, the decision
whether to refuse, on Fifth Amendment grounds, to answer the psychiatrist's questions."
United States v. Byers, 740 F.2d 1104 1118-1119 (11 th Cir. 1992).
Even in the cases cited by the State, the foreign courts recognized their holdings
would likely be different if the defendant was discussing the charge or other personal
information. In State v. Martin, 950 S.W.2d 20 (1997), the Tennessee Supreme Court
recognized the difference between the kind of information gathered in a competency
examination and a psychosexual evaluation. While citing this case for the proposition
that there is no Sixth Amendment rights as applied to a competency evaluation, the
State failed to cite to the portion of the case wherein the Tennessee Supreme Court
recognized the potential Fifth Amendment implications in court-ordered evaluations:
Preliminarily, we recognize that there are obvious concerns generated
when a defendant is compelled to undergo a mental examination at which
he or she will, in all likelihood, discuss not only details of his or her life but
also information about the charged offense. While numerous federal and
state jurisdictions have confronted these issues, there has been little
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discussion in Tennessee and essentially no detailed analysis of the
procedures set forth in Rule 12.2.
Id.

In Idaho, if any incriminatory information is divulged during a psychosexual
evaluation, the evaluator must disclose that information or face potential criminal
liability. See Idaho Code section 16-1619.

Thus, a significant distinction between the

two evaluations is the nature of the Fifth Amendment protection provided. Indeed, it is
precisely this lack of Fifth Amendment protection that the Estrada court relied upon, in
part, in finding the psychosexual evaluation to be a critical stage to which Estrada was
entitled to at least the advice of counsel. Id. at 562, 149 P.3d at 837.

E.

Conclusion
Based on the above, it appears the State has misunderstood the argument

made by Mr. Hughes and, as a result, has failed to address the relevant issue,
i.e. the scope of the right to the assistance of counsel in psychosexual
evaluations.
11.

The State Is Incorrect In Its Assertion That The Suppression Of At Least The Polygraph
Results. And Maybe The Psychosexual. Would Involve A "Novel Theory" Of Law
Because. It Claims. Mr. Hughes Was Not Entitled To Miranda Warnings
A.

Introduction

Mr. Hughes asserted two separate Fifth Amendment violations regarding the
psychosexual evaluation, which included the polygraph examination. He asserted, as
discussed above, a violation of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. He
also asserted a violation of his Fifth Amendment right to counsel. The State argues that
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the district court correctly concluded that a motion to suppress either the polygraph or
the polygraph and the remainder of the psychosexual evaluation would not have been
successful, and consequently, the attorney did not render ineffective assistance of
counsel. However, the State has failed to address this issue.
B.

The State Is Incorrect In Its Assertion That The Suppression Of At Least The
Polygraph Results. And Maybe The Psychosexual. Would Involve A "Novel
Theory" Of Law Because. It Claims, Mr. Hughes Was Not Entitled To Miranda
Warnings
The State argues that the suppression of the polygraph results would have

involved a "novel theory" of law and, therefore, counsel could not have rendered
deficient performance for failing to file said motion.

(Respondent's Brief, pp.15-16.)

Second, the State argues that Miranda warnings do not apply to the PSI or the
psychosexual evaluation and, thus, even if Mr. Hughes did request counsel, that
request did not have to be honored. (Respondent's Brief, pp.16-18.)

i.

The State Is Incorrect In Asserting That Suppression Raised A "Novel
Theory" Of Law

Contrary to the State's understanding, Mr. Hughes did not argue he was entitled to
Miranda warnings prior to the psychosexual evaluation. (Appellant's Brief, pp.27-38.)

Mr. Hughes argued that because, pursuant to the Fifth Amendment, he requested
counsel prior to the polygraph, and counsel was not provided, the results of at least the
polygraph should have been suppressed.

(Appellant's Brief, pp.27-38.)

He further

argued that because the unconstitutionally obtained polygraph results were used, in
part, to provide the basis of the psychosexual evaluation, because the extent to which
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the polygraph tainted the psychosexual evaluation, the psychosexual should also be
suppressed. (Appellant's Brief, pp.27-38.)
The State responds that Mr. Hughes was not entitled to Miranda warnings prior to
undergoing either the psychosexual evaluation or the pre-sentence investigation for two
reasons. (Appellant's Brief, p.13.) First, the State claims, "At the time of sentencing in
Hughes' underlying criminal case, it was well-established in Idaho law that a defendant
in a criminal case was not entitled to Miranda warnings before a routine pre-sentence
investigation or psychosexual evaluation."

(Respondent's Brief, p.16.)

Second, the

State claims, in essence, that the application of Miranda is limited to circumstances
where the interrogation is conducted by a police officer. (Respondent's Brief, pp.26-18.)
These arguments are misplaced.

ii.

The Theory On Which The Polygraph Could Be Suppressed Was Not
Novel

The State argues that the proposition that a defendant is not entitled to Miranda
warnings prior to a polygraph was "well-established." This "well-established" principle is
supported by citation to two cases. (Appellant's Brief, p.16.) However as at least one of

the cases does not actually provide support for the State's proposition, it would appear
that "well-established" case law is the citation to one case.
To the extent the State relies on State v. Curless, 137 Idaho 138, 44 P.3 1193
(Ct. App. 2002), to argue that there was "no right to Miranda warnings for psychosexual
evaluation because it is akin to routine pre-sentence investigations," (Respondent's
Brief, p.16.) it misstates the holding of Curless. Curless actually held there was no Fifth
Amendment right because Curless neither asserted it nor was subjected to
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interrogation. Curless at 143, 44 P.3d at 1199. There was no Sixth Amendment right to
counsel because it did not constitute a critical stage of the proceedings. Id. at 145, 44
P.3d at 1200.

In Curless, the court never reached the issue of whether the Fifth

Amendment applied to psychosexual evaluations because it found Mr. Curless did not
assert his Fifth Amendment rights in the evaluation. Id. at 143, 44 P.3d at 1199. The
court thereafter found that although Mr. Curless was in custody, he was not
"interrogated" because,
The questioning in this case did not take place in a police station and was
not conducted by police personnel. Rather, the evaluator who did the
questioning in the case was a neutral party appointed by the district court
pursuant to I.C. § 18-8316. Based on the circumstances surrounding the
questioning in this case, we conclude that Curless was not subject to the
compelling sort of interrogation contemplated in Miranda.
Id.

Thus, the Fifth Amendment issue in Curless was what constituted interrogation precisely the issue raised by Mr. Hughes, and an issue that was certainly available for
argument by trial counsel at the time of Mr. Hughes' sentencing.

Moreover,

Mr. Hughes' trial counsel should have been aware of "well-established" caselaw issued by the Idaho Supreme Court - on that issue at that time.

At the time of

Mr. Hughes sentencing, there was clearly established caselaw holding that the Fifth
Amendment applies to sentencing hearings, there was clearly established caselaw
holding

that the

Fifth Amendment

right against self-incrimination

applies to

psychosexual evaluations in capital cases, there was dicta that indicates the Fifth
Amendment right would apply to psychosexual evaluations in non-capital cases, and
there was clearly established caselaw requiring defense attorneys to advocate for their
clients, which would include arguing reasonable applications of the law. The Miranda
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warnings are designed as a prophylactic to protect, in part, against violations of the Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination.
(1966).

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467

If there is a possibility that a client's Fifth Amendment right against self-

incrimination has been violated, it is a reasonable application of the law, not a "novel
theory" to argue that in the absence of Miranda warnings, any statements or evidence
must be suppressed.
There was certainly sufficient case law for Mr. Hughes' trial attorney to be aware
that the nature of the interrogation might give rise to a potential Fifth Amendment claim,
thus, rendering the claim not "novel," but instead, a reasonable application of the
already-existing caselaw. Additionally, all the relevant case law in holding that the Fifth
Amendment right applies to court-ordered psychosexual evaluations was all decided
prior to the case at bar and therefore, was available to Mr. Hughes' trial counsel. See
Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981) (holding Fifth Amendment privilege applies to

psychiatric examination during sentencing proceeding in a capital case); Mitchell v.
United States, 526 U.S. 314 (1999) (holding Fifth Amendment privilege applies in a non-

capital sentencing proceeding); Jones v. Cardwell, 686 F.2d 754 (9th Cir. 1982) (Fifth
Amendment privilege attaches in presentence interviews); and State v. Wilkins, 125
Idaho 215, 868 P.2d 1231 (1994) (holding that the Fifth Amendment Privilege protects
against compelled testimony in a non-capital sentencing hearing).

Thus, a simple

review of these cases would have revealed that a reasonable application of the Fifth
Amendment case law would have been the application of the Fifth Amendment to
psychosexual evaluations used at sentencing in non-capital cases and for Miranda
warnings for statements occurring during a custodial interrogation.
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There is nothing in the record that established Mr. Hughes' trial counsel failed to
file a motion to suppress based on a strategic choice or a review of the relevant
caselaw. The State's Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Dismissal states only,
"Petitioner fails to present why the 'polygraph should have been suppressed at court',
so it is not possible to evaluate whether the lack of suppression was ineffective
assistance of counsel.' (R., p.72.) However, as noted in Appellant's brief, Mr. Hughes
did articulate at least two different violations of the Fifth Amendment as grounds for
suppression. (Appellant's Brief, pp.27-38.) Additionally, the state provided no evidence
that the reason not to file a motion to suppress was strategic. (See, Record, generally).
In fact, the district court found that Mr. Hughes' trial attorney rendered deficient
performance regarding the failure to advise Mr. Hughes of his Fifth Amendment rights
prior to the polygraph. The Court held:
Assuming arguendo that Hughes was advised by use of the Miranda
warnings before taking the polygraph, this is insufficient as a matter of law
to satisfy the requirements of Estrada. The examination given in this case
required Hughes to respond to more than just the polygraph procedure.
He was administered psychological testing and questioned thoroughly by
the examiner.
This latter examination clearly implicated his Fifth
Amendment rights. Because his counsel did not advise him of the rights
regarding the entire examation, Hughes did not receive the effective
assistance of counsel and his Sixth Amendment rights were violated.
(R., p.149.)

It appears that had trial counsel done basic legal research, as required by

Strickland, he would have discovered that his client had a Fifth Amendment right as it

applied to the psychosexual evaluation.
Further, as an advocate for his client, Mr. Hughes' trial attorney should have
made this argument as a reasonable extension of the law. Requiring trial counsel to
research relevant caselaw and argue a reasonable extension of that caselaw does not
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"hold defense counsel to an unattainable or impractical standard of legal competence
and sophistication," but instead, requires the level of competence and advocacy
articulated in Strickland for the reasonably competent performance by an attorney. See
United States v. Moss, 252 F.3d 993, 1003 (8th Cir. 2001).

Because minimal research would have revealed the above cases and provided a
basis upon which to move to suppress the evaluation or advise his client not to
participate in the psychosexual evaluation, and the Record is otherwise silent, this Court
should find that the reason for not filing a motion to suppress the psychosexual
evaluation was not based on a knowledge of the relevant cases and as such, his advice
did not fall within the sound trial strategy and cannot be presumed to fall "within the wide
range of reasonable professional assistance" as articulated in Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 648, 689 (1984).
The State's reliance on State v. Pizzuto, 119, Idaho 742,759,810 P.2d 680,697
(1991) does not provide support for the proposition for which it is cited. Although the
State correctly cites the holding of the Idaho Supreme Court, in federal court, the Ninth
Circuit held that, "it is now the law of this circuit that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments
apply to a presentence interview in preparation for a capital sentencing hearing."
(Pizzuto v. Arave, 280 F.3d 949, 965 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Hoffman v. Arave, 236 F.3d

523, 538, 540 (9th Cir. 2001)). First, what Pizzuto objected to was the testimony of the
individual who had prepared a PSI in an earlier criminal case in the state of Michigan.
Id..

The court, in analyzing the type of information that could be introduced at

sentencing, first noted that the admission of reliable hearsay did not violate Pizzuto's
rights.

Id.

In analyzing whether the admission of the testimony of the presentence
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investigator, the court distinguished Mr. Pizzuto's case from both Estelle and Jones,
holding:
Unlike the defendant in Jones v. Cardwell, 686 F.2d 754 (9th Cir.1982),
Pizzuto made no statements to Berro which incriminated him in any other
crime. We do not find that Pizzuto's fifth amendment rights were violated
by the admission of Berro's testimony or by the trial court considering the
1986 Idaho presentence investigation report in this instant case which
contains references to the 1975 Michigan report.
After carefully reviewing the record we hold that the trial court could
consider the testimony of Berro as well as the contents of the 1986
presentence investigation report. The record demonstrates that counsel
for Pizzuto had ample opportunity to examine the report and to explain
and rebut its contents. We therefore hold that Berra's testimony and the
1986 presentence investigation report were admissible at Pizzuto's
sentencing hearing.
Id., 119 Idaho at 760,810 P.2d at 698 (1991). Thus, of importance to the court was the

lack of incriminatory statements made by the defendant, a factor which further
distinguishes the case at bar, and not addressed by the State.

Mr. Hughes has

articulated the incriminatory nature of the statements made (Appellant's Brief, pp.17-26,
37-38, 77-78) and incorporated herein by reference. Thus, for at least two years prior to
the sentencing in Mr. Hughes case, there was case law establishing that Fifth and Sixth
Amendment protections applied to pre-sentence interviews, thus defeating the State's
argument.

iii.

The State's Attempt To Limit The Application Of Miranda To
Circumstances Wherein The Interrogation Is Done By A Police Officer
Ignores Existing, Contrary Caselaw

The State claims that "Hughes contends that Miranda warnings are required
whenever a 'state actor' asks questions of a suspect or defendant in custody."
(Respondent's Brief, p.17, citing Appellant's Brief, p.35-36.)
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A careful read of

Appellant's Brief reveals no such sweeping proposition.

What Mr. Hughes actually

argued was that because the individual who interrogated Mr. Hughes qualified as a
state actor for purposes of the Miranda analyses, the polygraph should have been
suppressed. In essence, the State argues that Miranda warnings can only apply when
the indvidiual doing the interrogation is a police officer. The State's reliance on Illinois v.
Perkins, 496 U.S. 292 (1990), for this proposition is misplaced.
Perkins involved a confession by a defendant to a jail-house informant.

295.

Id. at

Mr. Perkins then claimed that the informant was an agent of the state and

therefore, Mr. Perkins was entitled to Miranda warnings prior to being questioned by the
informant about the crime.

Id. at 295-296.

required, the Court relied on several factors.

In holding that no such warnings were
First, the Court noted, "Conversations

between suspects and undercover agents do not implicate the concerns underlying
Miranda. The essential ingredients of a 'police-dominated atmosphere' and compulsion

are not present when an incarcerated person speaks freely to someone whom he
believes to be a fellow inmate." Id. at 296. Second, the court noted that, "there is no
empirical basis for the assumption that a suspect speaking to those who he assumes
are not officers will feel compelled to speak by the fear of reprisal for remaining silent or
in the hope of more lenient treatment should he confess." Id. at 296-297.
The full context of the citation in Respondent's Brief is:
It is the premise of Miranda that the danger of coercion results from the
interaction of custody and official interrogation. We reject the argument
that Miranda warnings are required whenever a suspect is in custody in a
technical sense and converses with someone who happens to be a
government agent. Questioning by captors, who appear to control the
suspect's fate, may create mutually reinforcing pressures that the Court .
has assumed will weaken the suspect's will, but where a suspect does not
know that he is conversing with a government agent, these pressures do
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not exist. The state court here mistakenly assumed that because the
suspect was in custody, no undercover questioning could take place.
When the suspect has no reason to think that the listeners have official
power over him, it should not be assumed that his words are motivated by
the reaction he expects from his listeners. "[W]hen the agent carries
neither badge nor gun and wears not 'police blue,' but the same prison
gray" as the suspect, there is no " interplay between police interrogation
and police custody." Kamisar, Brewer v. Williams, Massiah and Miranda:
What is "Interrogation"? When Does it Matter? 67 Geo.L.J. 1, 67, 63
(1978).
Id. at 297.
The reason that Perkins is inapplicable to the case at bar is that Perkins had no

idea he was being interrogated by a government agent. In Mr. Hughes' case, not only
did he realize that he was being interrogated by a government agent, he attempted to
prevent such interrogation by requesting the presence of counsel. (Appellant's Brief,
pp.27-38.)

It was precisely the compulsion and his "fear of reprisal" that compelled

Mr. Hughes to comply with the polygraph. (R., pp.15 (The petitioner initially refused [the
polygraph] but, he was told if he didn't the judge would 'throw the book at him."').)
Unlike the defendant in Perkins, Mr. Hughes was well aware of the official power
exerted over him; it was to that power he succumbed and participated in the polygraph
examination. (R., pp.15.) The State cannot avoid the application of Miranda by utilizing
the interrogation services of someone who is there by order of the court, who appears
"to control the suspect's fate," who exerts "official power over him" but then claim that
because that individual is not an "officer," Miranda does not apply.
Moreover, in the case at bar, the district court noted that the "[polygraph]
examination given in this case required Hughes to respond to more than just the
polygraph procedure.

He was administered psychological testing and questioned

thoroughly by the examiner. This latter clearly implicated his Fifth Amendment rights."
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(R., p.150.) Thus, the issue in Mr. Hughes' case was whether the district court erred in
failing to make any specific factual findings about "whether Mr. Hughes requested
counsel for the polygraph evaluation and if so, whether the polygraph was obtained in
violation of that right." (Appellant's Brief, p.30.) Unfortunately, the State fails to address
this issue.
The State further attempts to argue that the rationale of Miranda and other cases
do not apply to "interviews conducted by persons who are not police officers and who
are not gathering evidence with which to bring or pursue criminal charges."
(Respondent's Brief, p.18.)

However, the State fails to recognize the holding and

analysis of Estrada. Estrada recognized the potential for the gathering of evidence with
which to bring or pursue criminal charges in a psychosexual evaluation, particularly
given that the evaluator must report evidence of crime or face potential criminal charges
himself, as part of the basis for applying Fifth Amendment protections to the
psychosexual evaluation process. See Idaho Code section 16-1619.
The additional arguments and authority regarding whether the attorney rendered
ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to move to suppress the psychological
evaluation because the polygraph was potentially obtained in violation of Mr. Hughes'
Fifth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel is set forth in Appellant's Brief,
pp.27-41 and need not be re-stated but are incorporated herein by reference.

iv

Conclusion

Based on the above, Mr. Hughes requests this court find that he was subjected
to a custodial interrogation, during which his request for counsel was disregarded, and
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hold that the violation of his Fifth Amendment rights resulted in a tainted psychosexual
evaluation that should have been suppressed.

111.
The State Misunderstands The Distinction Between The Issues Of Asking For A
Different Evaluation At Sentencing And Obtaining A Confidential Evaluation That Is Not
Disclosed Prior To Sentencing
A.

Introduction
Mr. Hughes asserts that his counsel rendered deficient performance in failing to

protect his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination before that right was
violated by his counsel agreeing to the dissemination of an as-yet-unprepared
psychosexual evaluation. Although the State would have the court believe otherwise,
Mr. Hughes does not argue the generalizations that it is ineffective assistance of
counsel to "ever allow his client to submit to a court-ordered (as opposed to a defensecontrolled) sentencing evaluation," or "that it is always ineffective assistance of counsel
to allow a defendant to submit to a court-ordered evaluation." (Respondent's Brief,
p.21.) Rather, Mr. Hughes asserts that counsel renders deficient performance when he
consents to the release of a psychosexual evaluation sight-unseen.
B.

The State Confuses The Distinction Between The Issues Of Asking For A
Different Evaluation At Sentencing And Obtaining A Confidential Evaluation That
Is Not Disclosed Prior To Sentencing
The State misunderstands the issue raised by Mr. Hughes, which thereafter

leads to an argument that is flawed. The State argues that the district court was correct

in dismissing Mr. Hughes' "claims of ineffective assistance of counsel for allegedly
failing to move for a psychosexual evaluation performed by an expert of the defense's
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choosing because counsel had in fact made such a motion, which the court had
denied,"

(Respondent's Brief, pp.18-19.)

This misperceives the claim made by

Mr. Hughes.
Mr. Hughes claims, and argues in Appellant's Brief, that his attorney performed
below a reasonable standard when he agreed to the participation, release and
disclosure of the psychosexual evaluation without insuring the confidentiality of that
evaluation so that Mr. Hughes could review that information prior to that information
being released to the district court and the State. Mr. Hughes is not challenging his
attorney's request for an additional evaluation after the first evaluation had already
been released.

To clarify, Mr. Hughes argues that his attorney performed below a

reasonable standard for failing to insure that the first evaluation was not released to the
court and the State unless and until Mr. Hughes and his attorney had the opportunity to
review the evaluation and then determine whether it should be released. (Appellant's
Brief, pp,79-82.) The State's belief that the "factual predicate of Mr. Hughes' ineffective
assistance of counsel claim was disproved," (Appellant's Brief, p.19) only highlights the
flaw in the State's reasoning.
Based upon a focus on a later request for a new evaluation, the State alleges,
"This appears to be an issue raised for the first time on appeal." (Respondent's Brief,
p.20, fn.5.) Both propositions are erroneous. First, Mr. Hughes presented this claim in
his petition. (R, pp.8, 21.) Second, the problems with the evaluation were addressed
at sentencing.

(Tr. 30823, 3/26/2004, p.4, L.22-p.5, L.3)

Third, this claim was

addressed by the district court in denying Mr. Hughes post conviction petition.
(R, p.143.) It is the denial of this claim by the district court that is being challenged by
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Mr. Hughes. (Appellant's Brief, pp.79-83.) As such, the issue was addressed in the
district court and is preserved for review by this court. State v. Dickerson, 142 Idaho
514, 518, 129 P.3d 1263, 1267 fn.3 (Ct. App. 2006) (issues presented at the district
court preserved for appellate review.)
Furthermore, Mr. Hughes does not claim, that it is ineffective assistance of
counsel to "ever allow his client to submit to a court-ordered (as opposed to a defensecontrolled) sentencing evaluation." (Respondent's Brief, p.21.) Nor does Mr. Hughes
assert "that it is always ineffective assistance of counsel to allow a defendant to submit
to a court-ordered evaluation." (Appellant's Brief, p.21.)
Instead, what Mr. Hughes actually argues is that his attorney performed below a
reasonable standard when he agreed to have Mr. Hughes participate in a psychosexual
evaluation, sight-unseen, and agreed to the release of that document without knowing
what the document would contain in light of State v. Wood, 132 Idaho 88, 967 P.2d 702
and Nelson v. Estelle, 642 F.2d 903 (5 th Cir. 1981). What Mr. Hughes actually argued
was his attorney,
should have protected his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination
before it was violated. Here, that required trial counsel to first obtain a
confidential evaluation and then review that evaluation to determine what,
if any, information should be released to the court and the State. Trial
counsel should have been aware of the Wood Opinion, as it was issued
prior to Mr. Hughes' sentencing. As such, trial counsel should have been
aware that he could not agree to the disclosure of an evaluation whose
contents were yet unknown.
(Appellant's Brief, pp.81-82.) Mr. Hughes provided additional authority as support for
his claim, which is set forth in the Appellant's Brief, pp.79-82 and is incorporated herein
by reference.
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C.

Conclusion
In light of the above, Mr. Hughes requests that his court find consistently with the

argument and authority set forth in Appellant's Brief.

IV.

The State's Claim That Mr. Hughes Has Not Established A Prima Facie Claim Of
Prejudice Ignores The Factual Claims In The Record

A.

Introduction

Despite its assertions to the contrary, Mr. Hughes has established a prima facie
claim of prejudice and therefore, is entitled to relief.

B.

The State's Claim That Mr. Hughes Has Not Established A Prima Facie Claim Of
Prejudice Ignores The Factual Claims In The Record
The State argues that because Mr. Hughes "never claimed he would not have

taken the evaluation had he known of his right to refuse and, second, because, as found
by the district court, Hughes' claims of prejudice are disproved by the record," he has
not established a prima facie claim of prejudice for his various claims. This argument is
simply incorrect.
The State's claim that Mr. Hughes did not assert he would have invoked his right
to silence and not taken the evaluation" is not supported by the record. In fact, one of
Mr. Hughes' claims was that he specifically did not wish to take the polygraph and
wanted counsel present for the examination. (R., pp.15, 116-117.) His desire to forego
the polygraph was also noted in the Presentence Investigation Report.

(PSI, p.31.)

Moreover, what Mr. Hughes argued was that the evaluation that was prepared should
never have been disclosed without first being reviewed by him and his attorney so that
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he would know what to reveal and prepare for sentencing.

(R., pp.20-23.) (("The

petitioner was denied his sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel when
the defense counsel failed to present the evaluation to the defendant for review in order
to plan a defense."); (R., p.20.); ("To have only the state appointed psychiatrist is not
giving the defendant and independent psychiatrist as required in Tuggle.") (R., p.20.);
('Trial counsel's failure to retain independent psychiatrist in order to present evidence
during sentencing phase constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.") (R., p.21.);
("Denying the defendant the opportunity to discuss optional forms of defense, whether
claims should be presented to the fact-finder or in interpreting the reports findings or
rebutting the states evidence.") (R., p.21.); ("Rather the functional consequence was to
limit the defendant to receiving the report of the psychiatrist, a report that was also
disclosed to the fact finder, while precluding the defendant from receiving the assistance
off a psychiatrist in interpreting or acting upon the report.") (R., p.22.); ("The petitioner
was not aware that the evaluation would be sued as part of the PSI report and used
against him as predictions of future dangerousness.") (R., p.23.)
Moreover, to establish prejudice, Mr. Hughes has to establish a reasonable
probability that, "but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). "A
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine the confidence in the
outcome."

Id.

Mr. Hughes did assert that he did not want to participate in the

polygraph, which was relied upon by the psychosexual evaluator and used to establish
future dangerousness for purposes of the psychosexual evaluation, both of which were
referenced by the pre-sentence investigator, and relied upon by the State to request the
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imposition of a harsher sentence. (R., p.151-154; Tr. 30823, p.5, Ls.17-21; Tr. 30823,
3/26/04, p.13, Ls.24-25; Tr. 30823, p.14, Ls.6-8; p.21, Ls.21-24; p.39, Ls.10-20; p.45,
Ls.12-20; p.43, L.15-p.44, L.1.)
Mr. Hughes disputes that the sentencing court did not rely on any of the
detrimental information in the evaluation.

(Appellant's Brief, pp.22-26.)

In fact, the

sentencing court does reference information that came only from the psychosexual
evaluation as a justification for the sentence.

(Appellant's Brief, pp.23-26).

Further

arguments in support of Mr. Hughes' claims of prejudice are set forth in the Appellant's
Brief at pp.17-26, 37-38, 77-78 and incorporated herein by reference.
C.

Conclusion
Based on the above, Mr. Hughes requests that this court find Mr. Hughes has

sufficiently articulated the prejudice prong of the Strickland, supra, analysis, such that
he be granted relief in this case.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Hughes respectfully requests that this Court find that the district court
erroneously dismissed Mr. Hughes' claim that his attorney was ineffective for failing to
be present during a psychosexual evaluation pursuant to both the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments, because although correctly finding that counsel was not present, it did not
determine why counsel was not present, and thus remand this case on those issue for
factual findings, if necessary, in light of the appropriate legal standards. Mr. Hughes
would also like this Court to find his attorney rendered ineffective assistance of counsel
when he failed to file a motion to suppress and the information contained in the
unconstitutionally-obtained polygraph and when he failed to obtain a confidential,
independent evaluation and review such evaluation with Mr. Hughes prior to the release
of that information to the State and the court. Finally, M. Hughes requests that this
Court articulate the correct test to determine the prejudice prong of the Strickland
analysis when the district court relied on a PSI and psyschosexual evaluation obtained
in violation of Mr. Hughes' Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.

Should

remand be necessary for factual findings on any of his claims, Mr. Hughes so requests.
DATED this 24 th day of March, 2009.

fl MOLLY. HUSKEY

State Appellate Public Defender
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